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This paper provides a comprehensive econometric framework for the em-
pirical analysis of buyer power. It encompasses the two main features of
pricing schemes in business-to-business relationships: nonlinear price sched-
ules and bargaining over rents. Disentangling them is critical to the empirical
identi¯cation of buyer power. Testable predictions from the theoretical anal-
ysis are delineated, and a pragmatic empirical methodology is presented. It is
readily implementable on the basis of transaction data, routinely collected by
antitrust authorities. The empirical framework is illustrated using data from
the UK brick industry. The paper emphasizes the importance of controlling
for endogeneity of volumes and for heterogeneity across buyers and sellers.
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11 Introduction
Buyer power is a paramount concern in competition analysis. It is a line of
inquiry in many competition investigations focussing on business-to-business
dealings. Quintessential high pro¯le examples are the relationships between
supermarkets and their suppliers.1 Another recent topical example is the
relationship between Chinese steel mills and Australian and Brazilian iron
ore miners.2
At the center of many competition inquiries are often generic products,
e.g. groceries or raw materials. Then, the focus is on per unit prices, usually
obtained by antitrust bodies as revenue per unit sold. This price measure
typically constitutes a combination of the respective portion of a nonlinear
unit price schedule and a lump sum payment, e.g. a franchise fee, rebate, ret-
rospective quantity discounts or other incentive payment that is the outcome
of bargaining over joint surplus between buyer and supplier. Hence, one of the
primary di±culties in the analysis of buyer power on the basis of unit prices
is the important distinction between nonlinear pricing and the appropriation
of rents by means of bargaining.3
The conceptual contribution of this paper is a framework that connects the
analysis of buyer power with the design of optimal nonlinear pricing schemes,
while at the same time incorporating bargaining over rents. It thereby illumi-
nates how buyer power is enhanced by the buyer's ability to switch between
suppliers, and is constrained by the suppliers' outside options and capacity; in
1On the European level, the European Commission considered buyer power issues in the German
- Austrian merger Rewe/Meinl (1999) and the French - Spanish merger Carrefour/Promodµ es (2000);
see also European Commission (1999). On the national level, see, for example, the recent market
inquiry into UK grocery retailing by the UK Competition Commission, in particular Provisional
Findings Appendix 8; the report can be downloaded from the Competition Commission website.
2See Financial Times UK online, 09 July 2008. In spite of shipping costs per tonne from Brazil
being twice those from Australia, Brazilian and Australian miners receive the same freight-on-
board price. This is interpreted as a re°ection of superior negotiating power of Brazilian miners
when bargaining with Chinese mills, given the size of Chinese demand for, and the limitations on
Australian miners' capacity in the supply of, iron ore.
3See also Bonnet et al. (2004) who investigate manufacturer-retailer relationships involving
nonlinear pricing. They present empirical tests of two-part tari®s with versus without retail price
maintenance embedded in a structural model of competition in di®erentiated product markets (e.g.
Berry (1994), Berry et al. (1995)) using market level data.
2particular, in contrast to Chipty and Snyder (1999), Smith and Thanassoulis
(2008) and some conventional wisdom, this paper shows that, in the face of
suppliers' capacity constraints, buyer size may diminish buyer power.
The paper proceeds as follows. After a brief review of the relevant back-
ground, section 2 outlines the theoretical model that guides the analysis. The
modelling framework is essentially nonparametric and, while amenable to fur-
ther re¯nements, is primarily intended to illuminate the main issues that an
econometric analysis of buyer power has to confront. Section 3 deduces some
conclusions about the empirical analysis of buyer power from the theoretical
analysis; it delineates testable implications and comments on important (non-
parametric) identi¯cation issues. It then presents the data used in the applied
part of the paper, which relate to the UK bricks industry, and summarizes
the empirical analysis. Section 4 concludes.
1.1 Buyer Power Analysis in Antitrust
The analysis of buyer power is often an integral part in antitrust inquiries. The
UK Competition Merger Guidelines (2003) consider buyer power in merger
assessment: Do buyers, either because of their size or commercial signi¯-
cance to their suppliers, have the ability to prevent the exercise of market
power by suppliers? This ability, if present, is akin to Galbraith' (1952) no-
tion of countervailing buyer power. The Competition Commission consider
such countervailing power as one potential mitigating factor, next to others
such as entry and switching costs, in the assessment of upstream mergers. In
the competition assessment in its market investigations (Competition Com-
mission Market Investigation Guidelines (2003)), it investigates the relative
importance to each other of each ¯rm's business with the counterparty; there
is an additional question whether any price reductions, obtained by virtue of
buyer power, are passed on to consumers. The guidelines enumerate several
factors that are viewed as potentially a®ecting buyers' ability to constrain
suppliers: buyers' ability to ¯nd alternative suppliers; the ease with which
buyers can switch suppliers; the extent to which buyers can credibly threaten
to set up their own supply arrangements, e.g. by backward integration or by
sponsoring entry; the extent to which buyers can impose costs on suppliers,
e.g. by delaying or stopping purchases or by transferring risk. It is worth not-
ing in this regard that a buyer's size can cut both ways: while size enhance the
3signi¯cance of the buyer's business vis-µ a-vis the supplier, it makes switching
more di±cult when alternative suppliers' capacities are constrained.
A prototypical buyer power analysis is the Competition Commission's in-
vestigation as part of its inquiry into grocery retailing in the UK (2008). Based
on their size, pricing and margins, the Commission concluded that all large
retailers, wholesalers and buying groups have buyer power vis-µ a-vis their sup-
pliers. However, the Commission considered that their buyer power is o®set
by market power of suppliers of branded goods; and that lower prices aris-
ing from buyer power in part are passed on to consumers. The Commission
substantiated these ¯ndings with an analysis of panel data, which for var-
ious store-keeping-units (SKUs) comprised yearly prices, volumes and some
cost information. The Commission's methodology consisted of ¯xed-e®ects
regressions of unit prices on volumes.
The Commission's analysis raises several questions. Panel data methods
allow to capture unobserved heterogeneity. The analysis modelled SKU-level
idiosyncratic e®ects, but is this the appropriate level of heterogeneity? More-
over, does aggregation to annual data mask latent heterogeneity across time?
The analysis may also raise concerns about the treatment of volumes: If
business-to-business relationships involve bargaining over both volumes and
prices, then volumes should be treated as endogenous regressors. Furthermore,
the caveat about the ambiguous volume e®ect notwithstanding, the Commis-
sion's analysis focussed on volume e®ects on prices as evidence of buyer power,
without attempting to quantify buyer's ability to switch suppliers. But vol-
ume e®ects on unit prices might just re°ect suppliers' nonlinear pricing and
self-selection of buyers into the appropriate part of the tari®, irrespective of
buyer power. Hence, this type of reduced form analysis might be critiqued
along various dimensions, and it highlights that the treatment of potential
heterogeneity across buyers and suppliers, endogeneity of prices and volumes
and the distinction between nonlinear pricing and bargaining over rents are
the primary empirical challenges of the empirical analysis of buyer power.
1.2 Related Literature
Its growing importance and policy relevance notwithstanding, the academic
literature on buyer power is still relatively sparse. Inderst and Mazzarotto
(2006) survey its main theoretical strands to date, as they relate to sources
4and consequences of, as well as policy responses to, buyer power of retailers
vis-µ a-vis manufacturers. With regard to applied work, the academic literature
o®ers very little towards a comprehensive, structural empirical framework for
the analysis of buyer power. Giulietti (2007) presents a reduced form anal-
ysis of the Italian grocery retail sector, approximating suppliers' bargaining
power by a concentration measure for the respective product level industry
they operate in. Chipty and Snyder's (1999) approach exhibits more detailed
structural features. It provides an empirically testable condition - concav-
ity of the supplier's revenue function - that needs to be satis¯ed for larger
buyers, e.g. arising from buyer mergers, to obtain lower transfer prices when
bargaining over surplus with their suppliers. This framework captures the
anecdotal view that larger buyers enjoy greater buyer power.4 It is useful
when the analysis focuses on revenues for bespoke goods or services; this is
the case in Chipty and Synder's application of their model to the US cable
television industry. Ellison and Snyder (2001) build on this approach and,
next to buyer size, investigate the role of substitution possibilities. They fo-
cus on price di®erences in wholesale pharmaceutical markets between di®erent
types of buyers, controlling for various institutional di®erences with regard to
drug administration.5 Related work by Villas-Boas (2007) examines verti-
cal relationships between manufacturers and retailers under data limitations,
when wholesale prices for transactions between them are not observed; her
4This is often referred to as countervailing (buyer) power, a term coined by Galbraith (1952) and
theoretically developed in a dynamic setting by Snyder (1996). Recent work by Smith and Thanas-
soulis (2008) demonstrates how upstream competition can endow large buyers with market power
by inducing supplier-level volume uncertainty. There is also some empirical evidence supporting
countervailing buyer power; see Adelman (1959), Brooks (1973), Buzzell et al. (1975), Lustgarten
(1975), McGukin and Chen (1976), McKie (1950), Clevenger and Campbell (1977), Boulding and
Staelin (1990). Dobson and Waterson (1997) and von Ungern-Sternberg (1996) examine the e®ect
on countervailing power on consumer prices.
5Drugs can be branded and subject to patent protection, branded and subject to generic com-
petitors, or generic and subject to some form of oligopolistic competition. Buyers such as HMOs
and hospitals have wider substitution possibilities through the use of restrictive formularies relative
to chain drugstores and independent drugstores. Ellison and Snyder (2001) empirically examine
the e®ects of di®erent features of drugs on the di®erence in prices paid by various types of buyers.
Using cross-section data, their analysis cannot model unobserved heterogeneity across buyers. The
empirical analysis presented in this paper demonstrates that there exist circumstances in which
the conclusion about buyer power critically hinges on accounting for unobserved heterogeneity.
5objective is to indirectly identify the strategic model appropriate for their in-
teraction, with a particular focus on the existence of double marginalization
pricing model, from demand and cost estimates.
2 Theory
The formal analysis proceeds under the following assumptions. Suppose there
is a single buyer. This buyer is characterized by a revenue function Y (q),
de¯ned over inputs q; Y (¢) embodies the technology for the production of,
and the competitive conditions in the market for, the ¯nal output good and
is assumed to be monotonically increasing, concave and di®erentiable.
The buyer faces suppliers who are characterized by supply functions S(w;t),
de¯ned over the per unit (of q) price w and the supplier's type parameter t.
Assume S is strictly increasing in w for any t; t is the supplier's private infor-
mation.6 The supply function S(w;t) is the inverse marginal cost function of
the supplier. Let C(q;t) be the cost function of the supplier of type t; assume
it is strictly convex with respect to q and di®erentiable. Given w, the sup-
plier's objective is maxq wq¡C(q;t), which implies w = C0(q;t) and therefore
q = C
0(¡1)(w;t) ´ S(w;t), where the superscript (¡1) denotes the inverse func-
tion, which exists in light of the strict convexity of C(q;t). Suppliers are as-
sumed to produce perfectly substitutable inputs to the buyer's revenue gener-
ating technology. Note that C(q;t) = C(S(w;t);t) = wS(w;t)¡
R w
0 S(v;t)dv.
When Nash bargaining bilaterally over rents, the buyer's bargaining weight
parameter is ® 2 (0;1) while the supplier's bargaining weight is 1 ¡ ®.
The analysis proceeds as follows. Given a set of suppliers, parameterized
by their respective types, the monopsonistic buyer presents them with a set
of optimal, possibly nonlinear per-unit prices. The joint rent that is induced
on the part of the buyer and suppliers is then bargained over bilaterally be-
tween the buyer and each supplier separately. This paper thereby attempts to
conceptualize buyer power as a buyer's ability to present suppliers with pos-
sibly nonlinear tari®s that are shifted up or down according to the respective
bilateral bargaining strengths.
6The supplier's type gets indirectly revealed, at least in certain ranges, by the supplier's choice
of the optimal portion in a nonlinear tari®; the degree of nonlinearity determines the degree to
which t is indirectly revealed.
6It is worth emphasizing at the outset that the theoretical framework out-
lined below is not intended to capture all the intricacies of business-to-business
relationships, but that it is intended instead to motivate the main issues that
econometric analyses of buyer power have to deal with.
2.1 Bargaining over surplus
Consider, ¯rst, the Nash bargaining stage. It will be shown that the buyer's
bargaining outcome is a linear function of the surplus that is bargained over.
This implies that, when designing optimal (marginal) pricing schemes, the
buyer's objective is simply to maximize total surplus. In contrast to the
analysis in Chipty and Snyder (1999), in this analysis the strength of the
respective bargaining position is shown to be endogenous, as is the feature
that the design of optimal nonlinear prices maximizes joint surplus that the
buyer and sellers bargain over.7
The following result considers a situation of bilateral monopsony-monopoly
and provides a useful benchmark.
Lemma 1: Suppose a monopsonistic buyer faces a single supplier, whose
outside option is zero. Nash bargaining takes place over a positive, ¯nite
surplus s. The buyer's and supplier's bargaining weight is parameterized by
® 2 (0;1) and 1 ¡ ®, respectively. Then, the buyer's bargaining outcome is
®s, while the supplier's bargaining outcome is x = (1 ¡ ®)s.
The proof follows from straightforward algebra. Situations with more than
one supplier permit equilibria in which suppliers compete with each other.
Before turning to results characterizing such equilibria, consider the following
recursive de¯nition of Nash bargaining equilibria in situations where a single
buyer faces a set of n potential suppliers, I = f1;¢¢¢ ;ng. Let ai(kj) denote
supplier i's outside option if bargaining between i and the buyer breaks down
in a situation where the buyer is contemplated to reach e±cient bargaining





. Suppose also that 0 < s(1) · ¢¢¢ · s(n) < 1, and that, in
bilateral bargaining, the buyer's bargaining weight is ® 2 (0;1), while the
supplier's bargaining weight is 1 ¡ ®.
7Chipty and Snyder's analysis focusses on ¯rm size as the primary source of buyer power in
bilateral bargaining. This paper incorporates ¯rm size indirectly, via the number of suppliers from
whom the buyer sources its input.
7De¯nition: A Nash bargaining equilibrium constitutes a collection of
suppliers Ik?
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Note that part (ii) of the equilibrium de¯nition requires implicitly that
supplier i 2 Ik?
j hold the belief that the buyer reaches an e±cient bargaining
outcome xm(k?
j) with all other suppliers m 2 Ik?
j n fig from whom the buyer
sources in this equilibrium.
The next result introduces competition among suppliers in the simplest
setup with 2 potential suppliers whose outside options are zero.
Proposition 1: Suppose a monopsonistic buyer faces two suppliers, whose
outside options are zero. Assume that individual bargaining between the buyer
and suppliers 1 and 2, respectively, results in the buyer's bargaining outcomes
b(11) and b(12). Nash bargaining takes place over a positive, ¯nite surplus
s(2) that is induced by optimal per-unit prices for both suppliers. The buyer's
and supplier's bargaining power is parameterized by ® 2 (0;1) and 1 ¡ ®,
respectively. Then, the suppliers' Nash bargaining equilibrium outcomes are
xi(2) = 1¡®
1¡(1¡®)2 [®s(2) ¡ (b(1j) ¡ (1 ¡ ®)b(1i))], for i;j = 1;2 and i 6= j; and
the buyer's equilibrium bargaining outcome is s(2) ¡ x1(2) ¡ x2(2), provided
b(2) = s(2) ¡ x1(2) ¡ x2(2) ¸ maxfb(11);b(12)g.
The proof follows from Lemma 1, the equilibrium de¯nition and straight-
forward algebra. The result shows that the buyer's ability to substitute be-
tween suppliers implies that the buyer's disagreement outcome in bilateral
Nash bargaining enhances his bargaining position and reduces the suppliers'
rents. Similarly, a relatively favorable bargaining outcome for the buyer when
8dealing with just supplier i, i.e. b(1i) high relative to b(1j), weakens supplier
j's bargaining position and thereby lowers the share of the surplus that j re-
ceives relative to i. The proposition, trivially, implies that the buyer is better
o® facing two suppliers, rather than a single supplier; clearly, the equilibrium
outcome of the game with one supplier is the solution to the constrained game
with two supplier, with the constraint that the amount bought from one sup-
plier be zero. It is also easy to show that collective bargaining on the part
of the suppliers vis-µ a-vis the buyer increases their joint bargaining outcome
relative to exclusive individual bargaining.
The following result expands on the preceding insights by allowing the
two suppliers to have di®erent bargaining power, arising from their respective
outside options. Speci¯cally, suppose that there are two suppliers, not nec-
essarily symmetric, whose disagreement outcomes are ai(k), where i = 1;2
indexes the supplier and k = 1;2 the disagreement outcome when there are k
suppliers in supply relationships with the buyer.8
Proposition 2: Suppose a buyer faces two suppliers, whose outside op-
tions are ai(k) > 0, i = 1;2, where k indexes the number of suppliers whom
the buyer has supply relationships with. Assume that individual bargaining
between the buyer and suppliers 1 and 2, respectively, over the respective to-
tal surplus s(11) > a1(1) and s(12) > a2(1) results in the buyer's bargaining
outcomes x1(1) and x2(1). Nash bargaining takes place over a positive, ¯nite
surplus s(2) that is induced by optimal per-unit prices for both suppliers. The
buyer's and suppliers' bargaining weight is parameterized by ® 2 (0;1) and
1¡®, respectively. Then, supplier i's Nash bargaining equilibrium outcome is
xi(2) =
1 ¡ ®
1 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)2 [®s(2) ¡ (xj(1) ¡ (1 ¡ ®)xi(1))]
+
®
1 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)2 [(ai(2) ¡ (1 ¡ ®)aj(2))]
where xi(1) = ®(s(1i) ¡ ai(1)), for i;j = 1;2 and i 6= j, provided that
(i) xi(2) > ai(2); i = 1;2;
(ii) s(2) ¡ x1(2) ¡ x2(2) > ®maxfs(11) ¡ a1(1);s(12) ¡ a2(1)g:
8This raises the somewhat more subtle question, however, how to interpret the supply function
that the buyer is faced with. Strictly speaking, the buyer can then no longer be thought of as a
monopsonist; instead, for the suppliers there exists some possibility of supply side substitution.
9The result shows that supplier i's disagreement outcome enhances his bar-
gaining position and raises his equilibrium bargaining outcome, while an en-
hanced bargaining position of i's competitor j reduces i's equilibrium bargain-
ing outcome. With a larger number of heterogeneous buyers, results about
the characterization of equilibria become more intricate, since the outcomes
of bargaining with various subsets of heterogeneous suppliers depend on the
respective composition of these sets. The following results characterizes equi-
libria with suppliers who are heterogeneous with regard to their outside op-
tions.
Proposition 3: Suppose a buyer faces n heterogeneous suppliers whose
outside options are ai(k), i = 1¢¢¢ ;n, when the buyer sources from k sup-
pliers, k = 1;¢¢¢ ;n. Given the buyer's Nash bargaining equilibrium outcome
b(n¡1) = maxfb(m) : Im ½ Ig > 0 in a situation with n¡1 potential suppli-
ers, suppose total surplus s(n) satis¯es s(n) ¡
Pn
i=1 ai(n) > b(n ¡ 1). Then,
the buyer's equilibrium bargaining outcome is
b(n) =
n(1 ¡ ®)
® + n(1 ¡ ®)
b(n ¡ 1) +
®








The result shows that, in equilibrium, the buyer's bargaining outcome is
a weighted average of his equilibrium outcome when sourcing from a strict
subset of I, b(n ¡ 1), and the excess surplus beyond the suppliers' outside
options generated by sourcing from all of them, s(n) ¡
Pn
i=1 ai(n). Proposi-
tion 3 provides a recursive result, conditional on b(n ¡ 1). In the presence of
supplier heterogeneity, there is no straightforward and succinct way to char-






alternative bargaining scenarios. The
following result, therefore, considers a restricted situation where all suppliers
are identical and is a straightforward corollary to Proposition 3.
Corollary 1: Suppose a buyer faces n identical suppliers whose outside
options are a(k) = ai(k) for all i = 1;¢¢¢ ;n, when the buyer sources from
k suppliers, k = 1;¢¢¢ ;n. Nash bargaining takes place over a sequence of
positive, ¯nite surplus s(k), satisfying s(k) ¡ ka(k) > b(k ¡ 1) > 0 that is
induced by optimal per-unit prices for all k suppliers that the buyer sources
from, k = 1;¢¢¢ ;n and b(0) ´ 0. The buyer's and suppliers' bargaining power













® + t(1 ¡ ®)
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Note that the result demonstrates that the buyer's equilibrium bargaining
outcome is linear in the surplus s(k), k = 1;¢¢¢ ;n. This equilibrium property
will become signi¯cant when combining, below, Nash bargaining over rents
with optimally set marginal prices per unit of factor input.
Under the restriction of identical suppliers and ¯nite total surplus s(n) for
all n, the Proposition has the following second corollary.
Corollary 2: Under the assumptions of Corollary 1, with 0 < s(n) < 1
for any n, b(n) ¡ b(n ¡ 1) & 0 as n ! 1.
The proof follows from straightforward algebra and the fact that the sur-
plus that is bargained over is ¯nite. Hence, the buyer enjoys positive, but
declining increments to his bargaining outcome as the number of suppliers
tends to in¯nity. This is a necessary, although not su±cient condition for
paid per-unit prices to decline with the number of suppliers.
The preceding propositions demonstrate that the buyer's bargaining out-
come is linear in the surplus that the buyer and the suppliers bargain over.
This implies for the further development of the theory of optimal nonlin-
ear prices in business-to-business relationships that the buyer's objective is
to determine a set of marginal prices so as to maximizes the total surplus.
The combination of optimal marginal price and Nash bargaining equilibrium
share of surplus induces a nonlinear pricing structure, and there exist circum-
stances, illustrated by a worked example below, under which this nonlinear
pricing scheme induces average, per unit prices that decline with the number
of potential suppliers.
2.2 Optimal nonlinear prices
Recall that the buyer's revenue function is Y (q), de¯ned over inputs q; it
is assumed to be monotonically increasing, concave and di®erentiable; and
suppliers present the buyer with supply functions S(w;t), de¯ned over the per
unit (of q) price w and the supplier's type parameter t. Suppliers are assumed
11to produce perfectly substitutable inputs to the buyer's revenue generating
technology. Suppose that the buyer can observe a supplier's type t.
Consider, ¯rst, the situation where the buyer faces a single supplier whose
type is t. Then, the buyer's objective is to choose w such as to maximize
Y (S(w;t)) ¡ wS(w;t) +
R w
0 S(v;t)dv; the ¯rst two terms capture the buyer's
surplus when unit price w is paid to the supplier, and the second term captures
the supplier's rent under this price. Straightforward algebra reveals that the
optimal price satis¯es
w? = Y 0(S(w?;t))
provided that the supplier's rent is positive, given w?. With more than one
supplier, say n, if the buyer can appropriate the entire surplus, i.e. when






























This implies that, at the optimal resource allocation, the marginal cost is the
same for all suppliers,
C0(S(w?
j;tj)) = C0(S(w?






; j;k = 1;¢¢¢ ;n:
Given prices w?
i, i = 1;¢¢¢ ;n, that satisfy this condition, the resource al-
location is e±cient and avoids the well-known double marginalization prob-
lem. Note that, if the supplier's marginal costs are the same (so t = ti
for all i) and constant in the relevant range, say c, then w? = w?
i and
q? = S(w?;t) = S(w?
i;ti) for all i, and Y 0(nq?) = c, and it follows that
the quantities the buyer purchases from each of the suppliers are indetermi-
nate, except that their total equals nq?. In this case, the entire surplus that
buyer and sellers bargain over does not depend on n. On the other hand,
if marginal costs are identical and increasing, then the buyer purchases the
same amount from each supplier, while decreasing marginal costs imply that
the buyer purchases solely from the supplier with the lowest marginal cost.
Consider the special case where n = 2 and the suppliers are identical, with
increasing supply function S(w). If the buyer cannot appropriate the entire


















Now, the optimal unit price w? satis¯es
w? = (2 ¡ ®)¡1 £
Y 0(2S(w?)) + (1 ¡ ®)Y 0(S(w?))
¤
;
Comparing this to the unit prices when there is a single supplier, ~ w? =
Y 0(S(~ q?)), and when there are two identical suppliers and the buyer has all
the bargaining power, ^ w? = Y 0(2S( ^ w?)), the above expression shows that
^ w? · w? · ~ w?, provided the marginal revenue function is decreasing, i.e. the
revenue function is strictly concave. In other words, with limited bargaining
power ® 2 (0;1), the opportunity to switch between suppliers permits the
buyer to demand lower unit prices than in a bilateral monopsony-monopoly
situation. But the risk of having to resort to a single supplier as a consequence
of a supplier's countervailing power constrains the buyer to higher prices than
in a situation with absolute bargaining power ® = 1.
Now consider the limit as the number of suppliers tends to in¯nity. When
the suppliers have no outside options, the buyer appropriates the entire surplus
in this case. Suppose that the limiting distribution of types is given by F(t),












with respect to the (smooth) price schedule w(t). To facilitate the exposition,
suppose that Y (¢) is linear, Y (q) = yq, y > 0. Taking a functional derivative











where f(t) is the density of F(t) and the subscripts w and t of S denote
the respective partial derivatives. Note that optimal nonlinear prices contrast
with a constant unit price ¹ w applied across all types t, satisfying




¹ t S( ¹ w;t)dF(t)
¹ w
R
¹ t Sw( ¹ w;t)dF(t)
·
1 ¡
S( ¹ w;t) R
¹ t S( ¹ w;t)dF(t)
(1 ¡ F(¹ t))
¸
;
13where ¹ t is the marginal supplier who provides a positive supply, given the
associated lump sum rebate, i.e.
Z ¹ w
0
S(v;¹ t)dv = 0:
The smooth optimal price schedule w?(t) can be approximated by a piece-
wise linear tari®, with associated lump sum rebates, whose limit is given by
w?(t).
2.3 Worked Examples
The following two stylized examples illustrate the preceding theoretical results
and their implications for econometric work.






t > 0 the supplier's type and ® > 0 a positive parameter. Then, the supply
function is S(w;t) = tw®. Assume furthermore that t is distributed with
density f(t) = ¸exp(¡¸t), with parameter ¸ > 0. With constant marginal






w?(t) denotes the optimal fully nonlinear price schedule. The induced supply






. Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration of this
case. In particular, it demonstrates how supplier self-selection in the pres-
ence of nonlinear tari®s can induce optimal price-quantity pairs that induce
a positive price-volume relationship in regression analysis.
2. For the purpose of illustration, this subsection presents a simple ex-
ample with two symmetric suppliers that illustrates the preceding results. In
particular, it demonstrates that, provided the suppliers' outside options are
not too advantageous, then there exists a bargaining equilibrium in which the
buyer sources from both suppliers and the unit prices that they receive are
lower than in a situation in which the buyer only contracts with one of them.
Suppose that the buyer's revenue function is given by Y (q) = 1
µqµ, for
µ 2 (0;1). The suppliers' inverse marginal cost functions are assumed to be
C
0(¡1)(w) = S(w) = w, where the type argument is omitted in light of the
assumed symmetry of the suppliers.
Consider, ¯rst, the situation in which the buyer only deals with a single





















Figure 1: Nonlinear pricing example: selection e®ect.
15Hence, the optimal factor price that maximizes total surplus is w?(1) = 1.
It induces s(w?(1)) = 1
µ ¡ 1
2. If the buyer's bargaining power parameter
is ® 2 (0;1) and the supplier's outside option is ¯, with 0 < ¯ < 1
µ ¡ 1
2,












Now consider the situation in which the buyer faces two symmetric buyers.


















































1 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)2
·






















of the total surplus, while the buyer receives the remainder


















For µ = 1
2 and various bargaining weights ®, table 1 presents bounds on
the suppliers' outside option ¯ that ensure that the participation conditions
(i) for the suppliers (x(2) > ¯) and (ii) for the buyer (s(w?(2)) > s(w?(1)))
hold and thereby guarantee the existence of an equilibrium in which the buyer
sources from both suppliers. The last column shows that these bounds are
jointly su±cient for the per unit prices paid by the buyer to be lower in the
multi-sourcing equilibrium than in the case of a bilateral monopoly.9
9The per unit price is w?(n) + x(n)=S(w?(n)) = w?(n) + x(n)=w?(n), n = 1;2, and x(n) is
decreasing in ® while w?(n) is independent of ®. Since x(1) decreases more slowly in ® than x(2),
the multi-sourcing condition on ¯ becomes increasingly stringent.












2 ¯ < 1:7818 ¯ < 0:760 ¯ < 3:6769
Table 1: Constraints on suppliers' outside option ¯: Participation and multi-
sourcing.
2.4 Capacity constraints
The framework of the preceding subsection can easily embed capacity con-
straints. Suppose that, in the previous setting, there are two suppliers of type












+¸(t)(k ¡ S(w(t);t)) + ¸(t0)(k0 ¡ S(w(t0);t0)):
Here, ¸(t) and ¸(t0) are the positive shadow values of the suppliers' capacities.
If the capacity constraints do not bind at the solution w? of the preceding
subsection, then nothing changes. Suppose, instead, that the type t supplier
is constrained, while the type t0 supplier is not. Then,
Y 0(S(w?(t);t) + S(w?(t0)t0)) = w?(t) + ¸(t)Sw(w?(t);t) = w?(t0):
Hence, the type t0 supplier bene¯ts from supplier t's capacity constraint in
terms of relatively higher per unit prices for its output; this is also to the
detriment of the buyer. Provided Y is strictly concave in q and S is strictly











where the superscript (¡1) denotes the inverse of a function. The above ex-
pression shows that, in the presence of capacity constraints, t's competitor's
price w?(t0) is a function of t's capacity and its shadow value ¸(t).
173 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Empirically Testable Predictions
This subsection delineates a few preliminary conclusions with regard to the
empirical analysis of buyer power.
Note ¯rst that, in order to account for buyer and supplier speci¯c e®ects
that are not directly attributable to measurable costs, it is desirable to have
panel data.
Typically, empirical analyses are carried out on the basis of average prices
per transacted unit. The preceding theoretical analysis suggests that, when
relating average prices to costs and quantities, quantities should be treated as
endogenous. Hence, appropriate instruments are required. Considering trans-
actions in a speci¯c buyer-supplier relationship, apart from lagged quantities,
transaction volumes from contemporaneous transaction with alternative sup-
pliers may be an option: They are correlated via the buyer's revenue function,
but uncorrelated with the primary determinants of the bilateral relationship
under consideration, at least under the hypothesis of the absence of buyer
power.
Furthermore, an empirical ¯nding of average prices declining with trans-
action volume is consistent with nonlinear pricing, whether or not the buyer
exerts any bargaining power.
However, the theoretical analysis suggests that, in the absence of buyer
power, (i) in the presence of constant marginal costs of suppliers, the num-
ber of supplier relationships should not a®ect average prices; and (ii) in the
presence of declining marginal costs of suppliers, the buyer optimally only
deals with a single supplier. Hence, in these circumstances, a statistically
signi¯cant e®ect of the number of suppliers on the average price in a speci¯c
buyer-supplier relationship constitutes evidence against the hypothesis of no
buyer power. On the other hand, if suppliers' marginal costs are increas-
ing, e.g. as a consequence of capacity constraints, then average prices per
transacted unit are unlikely to embed su±cient information to identify buyer
power.
Similarly, statistically signi¯cantly di®erent supplier e®ect are consistent
with di®erential bargaining power on the part of the suppliers, at least if all
essential costs are accounted for. Although the theoretical part of the paper
18does not model it explicitly, one would expect a supplier's outside option to
be a increasing function of the number of actual and potential buyer relation-
ships that this supplier entertains. These could be quanti¯ed by the observed
number of existing relationships with buyers, or by measures of how extensive
a supplier's business network is, e.g. number of plants or distribution outlets
and density of the supplier's plant or distribution network etc.
3.2 Background and Data10
The data for the empirical part of this paper come from the UK brick in-
dustry. This sector has been the focus of a recent merger inquiry by the UK
competition authorities where the question of potential countervailing buyer
power was also investigated, as bricks are a relatively standardized product
and there are several manufacturers in the UK. There are four main suppliers
of bricks in the UK, and the data comprise their transactions with all their
UK customers in the period 2001 - 2006. Customers are construction ¯rms,
or builders, and intermediaries, or builders' merchants.
Each of the four brick manufacturers is involved in all stages of the brick
manufacturing process. This process starts from extracting clay from the soil
and processing it, including shaping it, and eventually burning the bricks in
large furnaces or kilns. As transportation costs are signi¯cant in this industry,
most manufacturing plants are close to clay deposits. Two main types of
bricks emerge from these processes: facing bricks, used as cladding material
for the outside of buildings, distinguishing the more expensive soft-mud brick
from the more conventional extruded variety; and engineering bricks, used to
erect structures and accordingly meeting special requirements with regard to
load-bearing capacity and water retention.
The industry has been experiencing some decline over the last decades.
Industry sources attribute this to reductions in the number of houses built,
the change in the housing mix from detached and semi-detached houses to
apartments, and di®erent choices for structural and cladding materials, such
as timber, concrete blocks, steel and curtain walling (glass, laminates etc.).
With regard to the procurement of bricks, there are two primary channels.
10The description of the industry background follows the UK Competition Commissions provi-
sional ¯ndings report on Wienerberger Finance Service BV / Baggeridge Brick plc (2007), Appendix
C. The report is available from the Competition Commission website.
19One possibility is for buyers to purchase through framework agreements at
pre-determined prices. These agreements set out a matrix of prices and brick
speci¯cations, including brick type and transport costs to di®erent locations.
Prices can be quoted as ex-works or delivered prices. Buyers can thereby
negotiate the terms of the agreement, including retrospective rebates, poten-
tially on the basis of historic and prospective volumes. Eventually, once a
framework is agreed upon, there is, however, no ¯rm commitment on the part
of the buyer, who can call o® supplies according to the needs as they arise.
Builders' merchants also use framework agreements, albeit typically with less
detailed speci¯city. Framework agreements are typically negotiated annually.
Alternatively, bricks can be purchased ad hoc at spot prices. Buyers may
still enjoy eventual retrospective rebates, and many buyers who sign frame-
work agreements may still buy ad hoc, e.g. when a manufacturer wishes to
sell o® stock or a buyer experiences an unusual demand in terms of brick type,
location or volume. While the main manufacturers do have price lists, these
list prices do not apply to the bulk of bricks transactions.
The analysis presented here focuses on ex works prices per one thousand
bricks, i.e. net of transport costs, and also net of any rebates. Since the data
from one of the suppliers do not permit us to separate transport costs from
total transaction price, this supplier's data have been excluded from most of
the analysis.
There are just below 7000 customers that purchased bricks from the four
suppliers over the six year period 2001 - 2006. Table 2 shows that there is a fair
amount of switching of these between the four suppliers. But often, suppliers
are able to make up the loss of customers by selling increased volume to those
customers who are retained, e.g. supplier 3 in the periods 2001 - 2002; or even
compensating for loss of volume by raising prices on the retained volume, e.g.
supplier 1 in the period 2005 - 2006. Hence, while Table 2 suggests that
buyers' switching to and from suppliers is a salient feature of the UK brick
industry and hence provides the kind of conditions that potentially incubate
buyer power, it also provides some evidence that manufacturers' may have
market power when setting prices.
20Supplier 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06
Customers
Supplier 1 -0.061 0.017 0.015 -0.061 -0.045
Supplier 2 -0.119 0.099 -0.109 0.060 -0.100
Supplier 3 -0.208 0.0217 0.075 0.086 0.005
Volume
Supplier 1 0.046 0.046 -0.017 0.004 -0.029
Supplier 2 -0.197 0.363 -0.056 0.136 -0.0777
Supplier 3 0.001 0.030 0.010 -0.003 -0.079
Revenue
Supplier 1 0.084 0.113 0.044 0.006 0.0695
Supplier 2 -0.179 0.416 -0.011 0.181 -0.030
Supplier 3 0.030 0.088 0.039 0.050 -0.002
Table 2: Switching, relative to base year.
A brief description and summary statistics of the variables used in the
analysis are provided in an appendix.
3.3 Methodology and Results
The empirical methodology aims at uncovering the reduced form relationship
between brick price and various determinants of price. The speci¯c focus
thereby is on the question whether buyers who have established a greater
number of contractual relationships in the period 2001-2006 - as an indication
of their switching possibilities - bene¯t from lower prices, on average. The
empirical analysis attempts to control for various characteristics of the trans-
action. First, there may be volume e®ects when price schedules are potentially
nonlinear. Second, as in this industry transport costs are signi¯cant, relative
to brick price, there may be distance e®ects: Buyers with construction or de-
livery sites that are more distant to the manufacturer's plants may be given
discounts to capture their business. Third, the analysis controls for brick at-
tributes: On average, extruded bricks are cheaper than soft-mud bricks, and
similarly engineering bricks are cheaper than facing bricks.
In light of the foregoing theoretical analysis, transaction volume may be
endogenous. The analysis therefore, next to ordinary regressions, presents
results obtained from instrumenting volume. The decision to have the bricks
21delivered is likely to be correlated with the transaction size, but, in the absence
of bundling, uncorrelated with the transaction price which is net of delivery
costs. Therefore, a variable indicating whether the transaction volume was
arranged to be delivered, as opposed to being picked up, is used as instrument
for volume, next to time trends captured by month and year. First stage
regressions are also in the appendix.
Moreover, as is now increasingly recognized in applied demand analysis,
heterogeneity across economic decision makers is an empirical regularity that
should be accounted for, if possible. Panel data permit to control for buyer
speci¯c e®ects if they are present. Hence, the empirical analysis in addition
presents panel data estimators that exploit the entire richness of the data.
Table 3 presents the estimation results from di®erent estimation method-
ologies.11 Two main conclusions emerge when comparing the columns of the
table. First, comparing standard with instrumental variables regressions, fail-
ure to instrument transaction volume induces a downward bias, in absolute
value, of the distance and multi-sourcing e®ects. The source of the biases is
likely to be that the size of the buyer business determines both prices and
volumes. Large transactions are generated by larger businesses that enter-
tain a larger number of supplier relationships, and these tend to get lower
prices. Also, large transactions entail higher transport costs, and in order to
secure such deals suppliers grant more signi¯cant discounts. Second, compar-
ing standard with panel data estimators, failure to account for heterogeneity
across buyers biases the empirical results of this analysis towards a ¯nding
of buyer power, albeit only at the 10 percent level of statistical signi¯cance.
Controlling also for supplier speci¯c e®ects eliminates any buyer power e®ect
re°ected in negative coe±cients on the sourcing variable and captures the
distance e®ects that were present in the ¯rst ¯ve speci¯cations.12 Supplier
e®ects arise due to the di®erent capacities and plant network con¯gurations
of the three suppliers included in the analysis: Supplier 3 is by far the largest
supplier, with the largest number of plants and the widest geographic spread
of its plants.13 Hence, from a methodological point of view, accounting for
11The various acronyms are: OLS - ordinary least squares; IV/2SLS - instrumental variables/2-
stage least squares; RE - random e®ects panel data estimator; BE - between e®ects estimator.
12In light of the suppliers' plant network con¯gurations, the distance variable is highly correlated
with the suppliers' capacities, measured by the number of plants they operate.

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































23both endogeneity of transaction volume and heterogeneity of buyers appears
to be critical for the empirical identi¯cation of buyer power.
4 Conclusions
This paper provides a comprehensive framework for the empirical analysis of
buyer power that is useful for practitioners, such as competition economists in
antitrust authorities. This framework encompasses the two main features of
pricing schemes in business-to-business relationships: nonlinear price sched-
ules and bargaining over rents. Disentangling these two features is critical to
the empirical identi¯cation of buyer power. A structural theoretical model
investigates the principal determinants of optimal pricing schemes, with buy-
ers' switching possibilities identi¯ed as the primary source of buyer power.
It forms the basis for the delineation of testable predictions that enable the
empirical identi¯cation of buyer power. The empirical part of the analysis
presents an illustration of the conceptual approach o®ered in this paper, for
the UK brick industry. It presents a reduced form methodology to estimate
the impact of buyers' switching possibilities on prices. This methodology is
readily implementable on the basis of transaction data, as they are requested
routinely by antitrust authorities at the outset of their inquiries. The pa-
per emphasizes the importance to control for endogeneity of volumes and for
heterogeneity across buyers.
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from which the solution follows. ¤
A.2 Proposition 1




js2 ¡ x1 ¡ x2(2)j®jx1j1¡®;
and analogously for supplier 2. Solving yields the reaction functions
x2(2) + (1 ¡ ®)x1(2) = (1 ¡ ®)(s(2) ¡ ®s1(1))
x1(2) + (1 ¡ ®)x2(2) = (1 ¡ ®)(s(2) ¡ ®s2(1));
from which the result follows. ¤
26A.3 Proposition 2




js2 ¡ x1 ¡ x2(2) ¡ s(11)j®jx1 ¡ a1(2)j1¡®;
where s(a11) = ®(s(1)¡a1(1)), and analogously for supplier 2. Solving yields
the reaction functions
x2(2) + (1 ¡ ®)x1(2) = (1 ¡ ®)(s(2) ¡ ®s(11)) + ®a2(1)
x1(2) + (1 ¡ ®)x2(2) = (1 ¡ ®)(s(2) ¡ ®s(12)) + ®a2(1);
from which the result follows. Condition (i) is necessary to ensure participa-
tion of the suppliers, while condition (ii) is necessary to ensure that multi-
sourcing bene¯ts the buyer. ¤
A.4 Lemmas 2 and 3
The following Lemmas are useful for the proof of subsequent results.
Lemma 2: Let An be an n£n matrix that has An(i;i) = 1 for i = 1;¢¢¢ ;n,
and An(i;j) = 1 ¡ ®, ® 2 (0;1), for i;j = 1;¢¢¢ ;n and i 6= j. Then,
jAn+1j = ®n(® + (n + 1)(1 ¡ ®)):
Proof: Notice, ¯rst, that elementary rules for matrix inverses imply that
the diagonal elements of A¡1
n+1 are jAn+1j¡1jAnj. Denote the o®-diagonal
elements of A¡1
n+1 by z. Then,
1 = jAn+1j¡1(jAnj + n(1 ¡ ®)z)
0 = z + (1 ¡ ®)jAnj + (n ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ®)z:
The second equation implies that z = ¡(1 ¡ ®)jAnj=(® + n(1 ¡ ®)).
The proof proceeds by induction. The result can easily be veri¯ed for
n = 1 and n = 2. Suppose it holds for n. Then, the ¯rst equation above,
together with the expression for z, implies
jAn+1j = ®n¡1(® + n(1 ¡ ®) ¡ n(1 ¡ ®)®n¡1(1 ¡ ®)
= ®n(® + (n + 1)(1 ¡ ®)):
27This also implies z = ¡(1 ¡ ®)®n¡1. ¤
Lemma 3: For k an integer between 1 and n, let Bn;k be an n£n matrix
that has Bn;k(i;j) = 1 ¡ ®, ® 2 (0;1), for i;j = 1;¢¢¢ ;n and i 6= j, and
Bn;k(i;i) = 1 for i 6= k and Bn;k(k;k) = 1 ¡ ®. Then,
jBn;kj = ®n¡1(1 ¡ ®);
independent of k.
Proof: Without loss of generality, the proof establishes the result for k = 1.
Denote Cn;k := B¡1
n;k. Since Cn;k(i;j) = 0 for i;j = 2;¢¢¢ ;n, i 6= j, while
Cn;1(i;i) = jBn;1j¡1jBn¡1;1j and Cn;1(1;i) = Cn;1(i;1) = ¡jBn;1j¡1jBn¡1;1j
for i = 2;¢¢¢ ;n, Cn;1Bn;1 = In implies that ®jBn;1j¡1jBn¡1;1j = 1. Iterating







xj(n)¡b(n¡1)j®jz ¡ai(n)j1¡®; i = 1;¢¢¢ ;n:
Then, using the de¯nition of An in Lemma 2,
¡Anx(n) + ¶(1 ¡ ®)(s(n) ¡ b(n ¡ 1)) + ®a(n) = 0;
where x(n) = (x1(n);¢¢¢ ;xn(n))0, a(n) = (a1(n);¢¢¢ ;an(n))0 and ¶ is an n£1

















® + n(1 ¡ ®)
(s(n) ¡ b(n ¡ 1))
+
®
® + n(1 ¡ ®)
ai(n) ¡
1 ¡ ®






i=1 ai(n) > b(n¡1) implies that xi(n) > ai(n), so that
condition (ii) of the equilibrium de¯nition is satis¯ed. It then follows that






® + n(1 ¡ ®)
b(n ¡ 1) +
®







and the condition s(n)¡
Pn
i=1 ai(n) > b(n¡1) > 0 implies that b(n) > b(n¡1)
so that condition (i) of the equilibrium de¯nition is satis¯ed as well. ¤
A.6 Corollary 2
The result of Proposition 3 implies that
b(n) ¡ b(n ¡ 1) =
®
® + n(1 ¡ ®)
(s(n) ¡ b(n ¡ 1) ¡ na(n)):
Property (ii) of the Nash bargaining equilibrium implies that s(n)¡b(n¡1)¡
na(n) > 0 so that b(n) ¡ b(n ¡ 1) > 0 for any n. Furthermore, s(n) < 1 for
all n implies that this expression is bounded above. Therefore, it follows that
s(n) ¡ b(n ¡ 1) ¡ na(n) = o(1). ¤.
B Data and Auxiliary Regressions
The data comprise roughly six hundred thousand individual contracts be-
tween UK buyers and the (three) manufacturers used in the analysis. Prices
per one thousand bricks are in GBP. Volume is measured in the number of
bricks. Distance is measured in kilometers between the manufacturing plant
and the construction or delivery site. The sourcing variable is the number of
manufacturers that the respective buyer entertains contractual relationships
with during the observation horizon 2001 - 2006. There are dummy variables
indicating whether the bricks of the respective transaction are of the extruded
(as opposed to soft mud) variety, whether they are engineering (as opposed
to facing) bricks, and whether the buyer chose to have the supplier arrange
the delivery or collected the bricks.
The following table provides summary statistics.
29Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Price per 1k 637015 344.802 5093.57 0.0008306 3097000
Volume 637015 5991.746 3910.012 2 264000
sourcing 637015 2.567056 1.325533 1 4
distance 581112 4.089677 17.90908 0 341.3
extruded 637015 .6811441 .4660334 0 1
engineering 637015 .0723782 .2591133 0 1
delivery 637015 0.58792 .4922097 0 1
Table B1: Summary statistics.
Table B2 presents the ¯rst stage regression for the IV/2SLS estimation










Table B2: First stage regression results.
? signi¯cant at 10 percent level
?? signi¯cant at 5 percent level
??? signi¯cant at 1 percent level
The four UK brick suppliers have di®erent capacities. Suppliers 1 has 7
plants and supplier 2 has 20 plants. Supplier 3 is the largest supplier, with 23
plants and the largest geographic spread.14 For the three suppliers included
in the analysis, supplier 1 produced an average of 87.3 million bricks per year,
supplier 2 195.2 million and supplier 3 353.7 million bricks per year.
14This information is sourced from the Provisional Findings report of the Competition Commis-
sion.
30